Blogger Yuri Bogdanov says that for a year and a half of the war Ukraine was able to achieve equality of initiative in hostilities. Russia certainly started out as a dominant power – but now Putin has already lost the opportunity to decide when and how to end the war.
About strategy and enterprise.
Let us briefly formulate the fundamental difference between the capabilities of the parties and what is now (and will be) until 2022, the first phase of a full-scale invasion.
From February 2014 to February 2022, the climbing level was almost entirely determined by Russia. When to engage in more active hostilities, when to maintain a conditional stagnation.
From February 2022 to the Kharkov operation, the situation was the same. Despite the failure of attempts to capture Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa, Russia determined the location of the main events, the intensity of hostilities, the agenda of the war. It was not always possible to carry out the plan, but they determined the place and nature of events.
The path to the pair from Kharkov and Kherson began gradually. Yes, Russia’s “great attack” plan has developed exactly as we need it. Russia failed to adapt to Ukraine’s defense strategy during the winter. Quantity on land could not take advantage of quality in the sky.
The attempt to “turn the table” with attacks on infrastructure had a tactical effect, but turned into a strategic defeat. Russia failed to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure, and Ukraine received a super-strong boost in air defense.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive revealed the much greater adaptability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the possibility of changing tactics “on the go”. This testifies to the greater flexibility of the Ukrainian command, its ability to make and (more importantly) implement management decisions in daily practice DURING the implementation of its plans.
And in the end, who will take the strategic initiative with more or less comparable resources on the battlefield? More compatible. The one who will determine the battlefield in both attack and defense. And here the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine inspires. Because it proves its competence in practice. Like the entire vertical of command and control of the defensive forces.
Will there be resource parity? It’s already there somewhere. In some ways we are moving towards it. We are in a position to get ahead of the Russians in terms of the quality of artillery and the intensity of use of unmanned aerial vehicles. Somewhere – even with the political will – it will not be possible to equalize the linear advantage of the Russians. But you can make up elsewhere.
Therefore, now Ukraine’s ability to act proactively is at least as good as Russia’s. It even performs better in some places. Therefore, it is not possible for Putin to determine the level of escalation in one direction. He can no longer “stop the war whenever and wherever he wants”. It no longer depends only on the will of the Russian Federation.
Something like this.
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Source: Focus
Alfred Hart is an accomplished journalist known for his expert analysis and commentary on global affairs. He currently works as a writer at 24 news breaker, where he provides readers with in-depth coverage of the most pressing issues affecting the world today. With a keen insight and a deep understanding of international politics and economics, Alfred’s writing is a must-read for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the world we live in.